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Abstract
A number of collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported
sales data between firms, which use them to monitor compliance with a
target market share allocation. This paper shows that such communica-
tion between competitors may facilitate collusion even if all private infor-
mation becomes public after a delay. The exchange of sales information
may allow firms to implement incentive-compatible market share reallo-
cation mechanisms after unexpected swings, limiting the recourse to price
wars as a tool for mutual disciplining. In some cases, efficient collusion
cannot occur unless firms are able to engage in such communication.
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to better understand the role of communication
in collusive practices.
Collusion, whether tacit of explicit, requires mutual monitoring. In many
recent cartel cases, monitoring took place by having companies compare each
other’s self-reported sales with some agreed-upon quotas, with a high frequency
(often, weekly or monthly). However, these sales reports were for the most part
not verifiable, at least in the short run. For instance, in several cases, reliable
sales information was available only with a lag of about one year.
Prima facie, this observation is puzzling. If the goal of monitoring is to deter
deviations from a collusive agreement, why couldn’t a firm wanting to deviate
simply undercut its competitors and misreport its sales at the same time? At
∗Paris School of Economics and CNRS. Email: spector@pse.ens.fr
1
first glance, it seems that the only constraint on a firm’s incentive to deviate is
the amount of time elapsing between the date a deviation occurs and the date it
is bound to being revealed to competitors, as reliable sales data become public.
How, then, could the exchange of sales reports facilitate mutual monitoring and
collusion if it occurs long before sales data can be verified?
Answering this question would contribute to the ongoing debate on the an-
titrust treatment of information exchanges. In the absence of direct evidence
of cartel behavior, competition authorities face a difficult tradeoff. On the one
hand, an outright ban on information exchanges would deny companies and con-
sumers the procompetitive benefits that such exchanges may entail. Conversely,
a too lenient approach would allow companies to engage in practices that could
facilitate tacit collusion and harm consumers.1
For instance, in its guidelines on horizontal co-operation between undertak-
ings,2 the European Commission states that exchanges of information on past
sales are not prohibited per se (unlike communication on future behavior) and
that they should be assessed under a case-by-case approach. According to K.-U.
Kühn, a former Chief Economist of the European Commission, this case-by-case
approach should focus on the ‘marginal impact’ of the information exchanges
under scrutiny on the likelihood of tacit collusion.3
Accordingly, this paper is an attempt to assess the marginal impact of the
early disclosure of sales information long before it becomes public. When
‘hard’information is publicly available in any case, should early disclosure be
considered harmless cheap talk or a practice facilitating collusion relative to a
no-communication benchmark?
We construct a model showing that, in a market where demand is uncertain
and sales data become available with a delay, early communication on sales
volumes may make collusion more efficient. Communication may reduce the
recourse to price wars as a disciplining device by ensuring that unexpected
market share swings are swiftly identified and compensated through short phases
of market share reallocation.
Our main finding is that, for some parameter values, efficient collusion –
with monopoly pricing in all periods along the equilibrium path – can occur
1See Kühn (2001).
2Official Journal of the European Union, C 11/91, 14.1.2011, Communication from the
Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements.
3Kühn (2011) advocates “an analysis of the marginal impact of the information exchange
on monitoring or the scope for coordination in the market. If the marginal impact appears
small, the case should be closed.”
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only if communication is possible, even though such communication does not
increase data verifiability.
The collusive equilibrium we derive involves no need for contact between
competitors beyond the exchange of sales reports: it is symmetric, which limits
the need for pre-play coordination. It is a pure-strategy equilibrium, with no
need for coordination on a public randomization device. It does not involve
interfirm payments.
This suggests that competition authorities should be wary of exchanges of
information on past sales, even if they appear to be mere cheap talk and there
is no evidence of other interfirm contacts: by itself, such communication can
make tacit collusion more efficient and lead to higher prices.
The main features of the collusive equilibrium derived in this paper
The collusive equilibrium derived in this paper exhibits features similar to those
observed in many recent cartels.4
• The collusive scheme is based on a target market share allocation. This
is indeed the case in many cartels, especially those in markets in which
prices are not easily observed, for instance because they are set bilaterally
between sellers and buyers.
• Colluding firms exchange information on sales volumes at a high frequency.
They did so every month, in the case of the lysine,5 zinc phosphate6 and
citric acid7 cartels, and every week in the case of the Vitamins A and E
cartel8.
• When the exchange of self-reported sales data points to a discrepancy be-
tween actual and target market shares, which can happen as a result of
demand uncertainty, companies that sold above their quotas take steps
to adjust their sales so as to compensate those that sold below theirs.
According to Harrington (2006), whereas in some cases cartelists com-
pensated market share swings by making payments to each other (often
4Harrington (2006), Levenstein and Suslow (2006).
5Official Journal of the European Union, L 152/24, 7.6.2001, Case COMP/36.545/F3 -
Amino Acids, Decision of June 7, 2000, recital 100.
6Official Journal of the European Union, L 153/1, 20.6.2003, Case COMP/E- 1/37.027 -
Zinc phosphate, Decision of December 11, 2001, recital 69.
7Official Journal of the European Union, L 239/18, 6.9.2002, Case COMP/E- 1/36.604 -
Citric acid, Decision of December 5, 2001, recital 100.
8Official Journal of the European Union, L 6/1, 10.1.2003, Case COMP/E- 1/37.512 -
Vitamins, Decision of November 21, 2001, recital 577.
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under the guise of interfirm sales), in some other cases the compensation
was through market share reallocations of the kind highlighted in this
paper, as the continuous monitoring of sales volumes afforded colluding
firms “the opportunity to adjust their sales”. For instance, “the citric acid
and vitamins A and E cartels engaged in ‘continuous monitoring’ to assess
how sales matched up with quotas and, where a firm was at a pace to sell
too much by the year’s end, the firm was expected to slow down its sales”.
Likewise, in the zinc phosphate cartel, “customer allocation was used as a
form of compensation in the event of a company not having achieved its
allocated quota.”
• Self-reported sales volumes are not instantaneously verifiable, but they can
be compared to reliable data that become public with a lag. Accordingly,
firms are deterred from misreporting their sales because inaccurate reports
lead to price wars once they are exposed. This information structure is in
line with the facts of some cartels. Reliable information can come from
companies’ annual reports, verification by independent auditors appointed
by the cartelists, or import statistics. In many recent cases, market share
information was found to become available with a delay of about one year.9
For instance, in the lysine cartel, “ADM reported its citric acid sales every
month to a trade association, and every year, Swiss accountants audited
those figures.” 10 In the Copper Plumbing Tubes cartel, import statistics
were a reliable source of information on some producers’ sales,11 just like
Japanese export statistics allowed companies to check Japanese manufac-
turers’ sales reports in the sorbates cartel.12 In the Citric Acid cartel,
companies exchanged monthly information on sales, which was audited
regularly, but less often than once a month.13
Overview of the mechanism at stake The possibility that firms could
collude more efficiently by exchanging reports on their own sales may seem
9In our model, we make the strong assumption that the data that become publicly known
after a delay are accurate and detailed, whereas in reality they may be noisy and imprecise.
Firms may try to conceal some sales from auditors, as noted by Harrington and Skrzypacz
(2011); and firms’ annual reports, just like cross-country trade data, may not be very disag-
gregated.
10Lysine decision, recital 100.
11Official Journal of the European Union, L 192/21, 13.7.2006, Case COMP/E-1/38.069 -
Copper Plumbing Tubes, Decision of 3 September 2004, recital 141.
12Harrington (2006), pp. 36-37.
13Citric Acid decision, recital 37.
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surprising because such reports may lack credibility. Consider a collusive scheme
characterized by a market share allocation and assume that, irrespective of
whether communication takes place, reliable information on each firm’s sales
becomes public with a one-year lag. At first glance, it may seem that only this
one-year lag should have an impact on the sustainability of collusion and that
communication is irrelevant. If a company is requested to report its sales every
month, it can still undercut its competitors and at the same time fail to report
its increased sales. Both the undercutting and the lie will be detected one year
later, irrespective of whether firms communicate. How could monthly reports
make any difference?
The answer highlighted in this paper relies on the following difference be-
tween the deterrence of undercutting and the deterrence of misreporting: mis-
reporting can be spotted with certainty once sales information becomes public,
whereas, if demand is uncertain enough, undercutting may not be distinguish-
able from demand shocks.
In general, colluding firms observing market share fluctuations face a tension
between two goals. On the one hand, the collusive equilibrium should deter
deviations, implying that a firm gaining market share should suffer some loss
thereafter. On the other hand, since market share fluctuations may be caused
by demand shocks as well as by deviations, colluding firms have an interest in
avoiding that such fluctuations trigger price wars.14 One possible solution is
for colluding firms to set up a mechanism that compensates for market share
fluctuations while prices remain collusive, through transfers or market share
reallocations. This paper considers more specifically market share reallocations:
in the collusive equilibrium we derive, a firm whose market share exceeded its
quota is expected to reduce its sales for a while by increasing its prices, while
competitors still set the collusive price.
However, a market share reallocation phase provides weaker deterrence than
a price war. Unlike a price war, it is vulnerable to deviations because the
prevailing price during such a phase is collusive. A firm that is supposed to
decrease its sales for a while may fail to do so and profitably undercut its
competitors instead.
Therefore, in some cases, the only way to deter deviations is by having
market share swings lead to price wars, even though this causes prices to fall
below the monopoly level along the equilibrium path.
14The first formal approach to this tension is Green and Porter (1984).
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In contrast, the deterrence of sales misreporting involves no such tension. A
lie can be detected unambiguously by comparing hard data with earlier reports.
This allows for maximal punishments following lies, in the form of price wars,
without any efficiency loss since lies do not occur in equilibrium.
This contrast is the main factor making communication relevant to the ef-
fectiveness of collusion.
Absent communication, firms react to market share swings after one year,
once these swings become public. Since one year of high sales at the monopoly
price is very profitable, undercutting can be deterred only if it leads to painful
enough consequences once market share swings become public. This is why a
compensating market share reallocation may not work: in order to be dissuasive,
it would have to be long, and the targeted company might have no incentive
to reduce its sales for a long time. Price wars could then be the only viable
deterrence mechanism.
Consider now the possibility of monthly communication on sales volumes.
Since deterring lies is relatively easy - through the threat of a price war once
they are exposed - firms may be induced to truthfully report their sales every
month. But these monthly reports in turn make it easier for colluding firms to
deter undercutting. If each firm truthfully reports its sales every month, under-
cutting is detected after a month rather than a year. A dissuasive market share
reallocation thus need not be long. A firm having experienced an unexpectedly
high market share is therefore more likely to comply with the market share
reallocation mechanism. Communication could thus facilitate the recourse to
market share reallocations at collusive prices, rather than to costly price wars,
as a mechanism deterring deviations.15
The above argument holds only if there is enough uncertainty about demand.
If firms cannot infer market shares from their own sales, communication may
be necessary in order for swift market share reallocation to take place.
15In the Citric Acid decision, it is mentioned that the information exchange allowed collud-
ing firms to ’monitor the correct implementation of [the] quotas and avoid, as far as possible,
the need for compensation at the end of each year’ (recital 100). In that case, the outcome
that colluding firms attempted to avoid thanks to the frequent exchange of sales reports was a
need for compensating interfirm payments (which are ruled out by assumption in our model)
rather than a price war (as per the theory presented in this paper). Despite this difference, this
quote nevertheless illustrates one of the key ideas of this paper: the role of communication on
sales volumes is to allow for frequent market share adjustements so as to avoid less desirable
outcomes that might occur, absent communication, if market share swings were detected with
a longer delay.
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Relation to the literature The literature on the role of communication in
collusion comprises two main sets of contributions.
Several papers address pre-play communication in the presence of private
cost information.16 The role of communication in these contexts is to facili-
tate the definition of an efficient collusive outcome, taking into account cost
asymmetries.
Another branch of the literature addresses the role of communication as a
private monitoring tool in repeated games. Compte (1998) and Kandori and
Matsushima (1998) derive folk theorems, showing that infinitely patient players
may achieve efficiency (i.e., collusion with maximum profits) if they can com-
municate to facilitate mutual monitoring.17 Our contribution differs from these
on several grounds. First, the equilibria derived in these papers are highly ab-
stract and the communication mechanisms are complex, whereas our goal is to
make sense of a simple communication device, often observed in reality, namely,
the exchange of own sales reports. Second, it is assumed in these papers that
payments across firms are possible, whereas we rule them out. Third, these
contributions do not address comparative statics, whereas we are interested
in comparing the sustainability of collusion with and without communication.
Fourth, the main results in these papers require the presence of at least three
firms, which reflects the role of communication in their analyses: with at least
three firms, each of which has some evidence on the identity of the deviator
in the event of a deviation, firms can pool their information on the deviator’s
identity, and identify it. In contrast, our contribution focuses on firms com-
municating on their own sales and our main result does not require that the
number of firms be at least three.
Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011, ’HS’ hereafter) and Chan and Zhang (2012,
’CZ’ hereafter) are closely related to this paper since they address the role of
non-verifiable sales reports. They show that there may exist collusive equilibria
in which companies monitor each other by exchanging sales reports, even though
these reports can never be verified.
This paper differs from HS and CZ as regards both the nature of the main
result and the assumptions of the model.
Whereas these two papers characterize plausible collusive equilibria involv-
ing communication, ours provides a comparative statics result, showing that for
some parameter values, sustaining monopoly prices requires firms to engage in
16Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2008); see also Aoyagi (2002, 2007).
17See also Obara (2009).
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communication. This result is a first step towards identifying the marginal im-
pact on the feasibility of collusion of communication on past market outcomes.18
Our assumptions depart from those in HS and CZ, regarding both the infor-
mation structure and the strategy space.
HS and CZ assume that neither price nor sales data ever become public,
whereas we assume sales data to become public with a delay. Neither of these
assumptions is inherently better than the other, since both types of information
structures are found in the real world, depending on the market.
HS and CZ also assume that firms can make direct payments to each other,
whereas we rule out such payments. Accordingly, in the collusive equilibria
they derive, market share swings are compensated through interfirm payments,
whereas in our model they are compensated through market share reallocations.
Again, none of these features is inherently more relevant than the other, since
both types of corrective mechanisms have been found to occur. The corrective
market share reallocation mechanism highlighted in this paper, however, is prob-
ably better suited to the analysis of tacit collusion, which is the most relevant
context for the analysis of information exchanges from a legal viewpoint (since
in the case of explicit collusion, competition authorities can rely on evidence
beyond the information exchange).
Finally, Awaya and Krishna (2014, ’AK’ hereafter) prove a result related to
ours, deriving conditions under which communication on past sales increases
profits relative to tacit collusion. However, our model and AK’s are relevant
to different settings. AK assume that sales data remain private forever, and in
their model, sales reports that point to a discrepancy between actual and target
market shares (or to inaccurate reports) are followed by a permanent shift to
non-collusive behavior. In contrast, our model is relevant to the cases described
above, characterized by the following features: (i) private sales information
becomes public after a delay, and (ii) sales reports that reveal a discrepancy
between actual and target market shares are followed by a temporary corrective
reallocation phase at collusive prices.
Organization of the paper This paper is organized as follows. After pre-
senting the model (Section 2), we derive a sufficient condition for the non-
existence of any symmetric efficient collusive equilibrium without communica-
18Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2008) also derive comparative statics results on the role of
communication. But they relate to a different type of communication in a different setting,
namely, pre-play coordination to take into account private cost information.
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tion (Section 3), and a sufficient condition for the existence of such an equi-
librium when firms can exchange sales reports (Section 4). Combining these
results allows us to derive a sufficient condition for such communication to be
necessary to the existence of a symmetric efficient collusive equilibrium (Section
5). Section 6 concludes with a few remarks on policy implications and future
research.
2 The model
2.1 Firms
There are n firms producing produce a heterogeneous good at zero cost, and
facing the same rate of time preference δ. Each firm’s only action, in each
period, is the choice of its price (at the beginning of the period) and, in some
of the games we will investigate, of its sales report (at the end of the period).
2.2 Demand
There is a continuum of consumers. Its mass is normalized to 1.
The demand function depends on the state of the world, which is drawn from
some (constant) probability distribution. The draws are independent across
periods. A state of the world is characterized by two parameters: total demand
(which is price-inelastic), and whether demand is ’normal’ or ’biased’ towards
one firm. Total demand can take any value ∆ within a finite set S of nonnegative
numbers.19
There exists V > 0 (to be interpreted as consumers’ per-unit valuation of
the good) such that the demand function is as follows.
Demand in the ’normal’ states of the world In a normal state of the
world such that total demand is ∆, consumers consider all n goods as perfect
substitutes. They attribute to the homogeneous good a subjective valuation
equal to V , so that if the lowest of all firms’ prices does not exceed V , total
sales are equal to ∆ and they are evenly distributed among all the firms setting
the lowest price. Formally, the demand function is as follows (with pi denoting
19The assumption that the set of possible demand realizations is finite is made for tractabil-
ity. It implies that any element of S can be equal to total demand with a strictly positive
probability. Our results would carry over to a model in which the set of possible demand
realizations is infinite.
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the price set by Firm i and DN,Di (p1, .., pn; ∆) denoting Firm i ’s sales as a
function of all firms’ prices, when demand is normal and total demand is ∆):
• If Min(p1, ..., pn) > V or pi > Min(p1, ..., pn) then DN,Di (p1, .., pn; ∆) =
0;
• IfMin(p1, ..., pn) ≤ V and pi = Min(p1, ..., pn) then DN,Di (p1, .., pn; ∆) =
∆
#({ j|pj=Min(p1,...,pn)}) .
Demand in the ’biased’ states of the world A state of the world that
is biased in favor of Firm i is similar to a normal one, with one difference:
consumers have a preference for Firm i ’s product, but a very weak one, in the
sense that preferences are lexicographic. If prices are identical (and not greater
than the willingness to pay), then in an i -biased demand state of the world, the
entire demand goes to Firm i . But if prices are different, then the entire demand
goes to the firm(s) setting the lowest price (as long as this price does not exceed
the willingness to pay). This corresponds to the following demand function,
with Di,Dj (p1, .., pn; ∆) denoting Firm j’s sales as a function of all firms’ prices,
when demand is biased in favor of Firm i and total demand is D):
• IfMin(p1, ..., pn) > V or pj > Min(p1, ..., pn) then Di,Dj (p1, .., pn; ∆) = 0;
• IfMin(p1, ..., pn) ≤ V and i 6= j and pi = Min(p1, ..., pn) thenDi,Dj (p1, .., pn; ∆) =
0;
• If Min(p1, ..., pn) ≤ V and i 6= j andpj = Min(p1, ..., pn) and pi 6=
Min(p1, ..., pn) then D
i,D
j (p1, .., pn; ∆) =
∆
#({m|pm=Min(p1,...,pn)}) ;
• IfMin(p1, ..., pn) ≤ V and i = j and pi = Min(p1, ..., pn) thenDi,Dj (p1, .., pn; ∆) =
∆.
Notice that if demand is zero, the above characterizations of normal and biased
states of the world both apply. For ease of exposition, we call a zero-demand
state a normal state of the world, rather than a biased one.
Assumptions about the states of the world We make the following as-
sumptions about the states of the world.
• We assume that for any ∆ ∈ S , the probability that the state of the world
is normal with total demand equal to ∆ is strictly positive.
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• Let SB (⊂ S ) denote the set of possible levels of demand in the case of
biased demand (that is, the set of values of ∆ such that, with a nonzero
probability, demand is biased in favor of some firm and total demand is
∆). For simplicity (and without any loss of generality), we assume that if
∆ ∈ SB , then for any i = 1 , ...,n there exists a state of the world such that
demand is biased in favor of Firm i and total demand is ∆.We also assume
that the probability that demand is biased in favor of any particular firm
is the same for all firms.
The two assumptions above are made for the sake of simplicity. They are not
necessary for the results of this paper.
In contrast, the following assumptions, which are also made throughout the
paper, are crucial because of their implications in terms of the information
that firms can infer from sales data, in the event of a hypothetical collusive
equilibrium characterized by all firms setting the monopoly price V .
• 0 ∈ S. The possibility of a low demand shock implies that a firm selling
zero cannot tell, from its own sales alone, between a low demand shock
and other possible causes (such as a deviation by some competitor, or
biased demand).20
• SB 6= Ø. This assumption implies that in some states of the world, observ-
ing all firms’ sales is not sufficient to tell whether a deviation took place.
More precisely, in a state of the world (normal or biased) characterized
by total demand ∆ ∈ SB , then undercutting by Firm i leads to the same
distribution of sales as the absence of any deviation in the presence of
biased demand (in favor of Firm i).
• SB ) SK , with SK denoting the set {∆|∆ ∈ SBandn∆ /∈ S}. This as-
sumption implies that it is possible (whenever demand is biased and total
demand belongs to SB \ SK) that all firms set the same price, sales are
asymmetric (with only one firm having nonzero sales) and the firm mak-
ing nonzero sales cannot know from observing its own sales that sales are
asymmetric. The reason is that a firm benefitting from biased demand
with total demand ∆ ∈ SB \ SK cannot rule out, by observing its own
sales, the possibility that the state of the world be normal demand with
total demand equal to n∆. In other words, if ∆ ∈ SB \ SK , a firm that
20This impossibility of distinguishing between an aggregate negative demand shock and a
deviation is the main element of Green and Porter’s (1984) analysis.
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deviated can plausibly claim that, even after observing its own sales (equal
to ∆), it could not know that sales were asymmetric.
Notations We define the following probabilities.
• piL denotes the probability that total demand is zero. The above assump-
tions imply that piL > 0.
• piH denotes the probability that total demand belongs to SH = S r (SB ∪ {0}).
In the event that a firm undercuts its competitors, piH is the probability
that the information on all firms’ sales is sufficient to allow one to infer that
such undercutting took place. This is because, if total demand belongs to
SH , asymmetric sales can be explained only by price heterogeneity. The
above assumptions imply that piH < 1.
• piK denotes the probability that total demand belongs to SK . piK can be
interpreted as the probability that, after Firm i undercuts its competitors
and all sales become public, Firm i will be unable to plausibly claim that
it did not know that sales were asymmetric after it observed its own sales
alone. The above assumptions imply that piK < 1.
• piB denotes the probability that demand is biased. The above assumptions
imply that piB > 0 and that the probability that demand is biased in favor
of a specific set of r firms is equal to rpi
B
n .
• Dt denotes total demand in period t (when the lowest price is lower than
or equal to V).
• D denotes total expected demand ahead of any period.
• dt = Dtn denotes per-firm demand in period t .
• d = Dn denotes per-firm expected demand ahead of any period.
2.3 Timing of the game
The game is repeated for infinitely many periods, starting in period 1.
Each period is divided into three or four stages (depending on whether firms
can make sales reports).
Stage 1. Firms simultaneously set prices.
Stage 2. The state of the world is determined at random.
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Stage 3. Each firm observes the demand addressed to it and serves it.
Stage 4 (in some variants). Firms simultaneously make a statement on their
own sales.
The above demand function and the zero cost assumption imply that the
static game leads to zero prices and zero profits: the logic of Bertrand compe-
tition applies.
2.4 Information structure
The state of the world is never observed by any player.
At the end of period t, a firm observes only its own sales and (except for
t = 1) the sales made by the other firms in period t− 1. In other words, at the
end of a period, a firm knows all its past sales and all the sales of the other firms
till the penultimate period. In the variant in which firms can communicate, a
firm’s information at the end of a period also includes all the statements made by
all firms in all previous periods and in the current one. A firm cannot observe
the prices set by the other firms either in the current period or in any past
period.
As is explained above, these assumptions imply that a firm can infer little
information on the state of the world, its competitors’ actions, or its market
share, from observing its own sales.
This difficulty in inferring market shares from own sales information is a
major driver of our results. It leaves a role for communication, since pooling
sales data is the only way for firms to infer market shares, even though this is
in some cases not sufficient to infer the state of the world.21 This assumption
is realistic, since in many cartels the exchange of sales information was meant
to allow colluding firms to estimate total sales and individual market shares, in
environments characterized by the lack of price transparency.
2.5 Strategies
Strategies when communication is not possible We describe hereafter
strategies in the case where communication is not possible.
Let P denote the set of possible prices (i.e., the set of nonnegative real
numbers).
21In contrast, Marshall and Marx (2008), who study a collusive equilibrium based on a
market share allocation, assume that market share data are sufficient to allow a firm to
identify deviations by competitors.
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Let ft =
(
f1t , ..., f
n
t
)
denote all firms’ sales at the end of period t (which
become publicly observable at the end of period t+ 1).
Let pit denote the price set by Firm i in period t.
For Firm i, a strategy S is an infinite set of functions (s1, s2, ..., st, ...), where
st maps all the information known to Firm X at the beginning of period t into
the set of possible prices:22
st :
(
(f1, .., ft−2) , f it−1,
(
pi1, .., p
i
t−1
))→ pt(P ).
Strategies when firms can communicate at the end of each period
When communication is possible at the end of each period, strategies are mod-
ified in the following way. There is a message set M (to be specified later). At
the end of each period, a firm chooses a message from M , depending on the
information known to it at the end of the period (including past observed sales,
past own prices, own sales in the current period, and all firms’ past messages).
Likewise, at the beginning of every period, the action chosen by each firm (that
is, its price) depends on past own sales and prices, the other firms’ publicly
observed past sales, and all firms’ past messages.
2.6 Equilibria
We focus throughout the paper on perfect equilibria involving pure strategies.
Moreover, we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria, as is explained
hereafter. The symmetry requirement is well suited to the analysis of tacit
collusion because a symmetric equilibrium is a more natural focal point than an
asymmetric one.23
Definition - Symmetric equilibria Consider two possible series of observed
sales over t periods, f1 =
((
f111 , ..., f
1n
1
)
, ...,
(
f11t , f
1n
t
))
and f2 =
((
f211 , ..., f
2n
1
)
, ...,
(
f21t , ..., f
2n
t
))
.
f1 and f2 are said to be symmetric with respect to σ if there exists a permuta-
tion σ of {1, ..., n} such that for each t′ ≤ t, and each j ∈ {1, ..., n}, f1jt′ = f2σ(j)t′ .
An equilibrium pair of strategies
(
S1, S2
)
is said to be symmetric if there exists
a permutation σ of {1, ..., n} such that for any t ≥ 1, any j ∈ {1, ..., n} , any pair
observed sales history
(
f1, f2
)
of length Min(0, t − 2) that is symmetric with
22We consider prices rather than probability distributions over prices because we focus on
pure-strategy equilibria.
23Models of collusion often make this assumption (see the discussion in Athey and Bagwell
(2001) and in Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004)).
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respect to σ, any history of past own prices Pt = (p1, ..., pt−1), and any period
(t − 1 ) own sales yt−1 :
s1jt
(
f1, yt−1, Pt
)
= s
2σ(j)
t
(
f2, yt−1, Pt
)
.
Our goal is to assess whether communication can facilitate efficient collusion,
that is, market outcomes such that firms earn monopoly profits. This leads us
to define efficient collusive equilibria.
Definition - Efficient collusive equilibria An efficient collusive equilibrium
is a subgame perfect equilibrium such that, in every period t, total profits are
equal to the monopoly profit V Dt.
In the remainder of this paper, we focus on symmetric efficient collusive
equilibria (“SECE”).
3 The scope for collusion without communication
In this section, we derive a sufficient condition for there to exist no SECE when
communication is not possible.
Proposition 1. If the condition
n− 1− nδ4 − n(1− δ) [piHδ2 + (piH (2− piH − piK)+ piK) δ3] ≥ 0 (1)
holds, then there exists no symmetric efficient collusive equilibrium.
A SECE must include a mechanism deterring deviations. This means that,
after sales data revealed that only Firm i had sales above zero, outcomes must
be unfavorable to Firm i for a while. The efficiency requirement mandates that,
unless sales data unambiguously reveal a deviation from equilibrium behavior,
such an asymmetry should be corrected not through a price war, but rather by
having Firm i voluntarily withdraw from the market for some time, by setting a
price strictly above the monopoly price. As we show hereafter, the constraints
imposed on such correction phases by the efficiency requirement are such that
a SECE strategy profile must allow any firm to undercut its competitors and
earn monopoly profits in each of the first four periods (with probability 1 in the
first two periods, and a smaller, but positive probability in Periods 3 and 4).
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Consider a SECE, denoted Eq∗. Because of the symmetry requirement, it
must be the case that in Eq∗, all firms set the monopoly price V in Period 1.
Assume that Firm 1 (without loss of generality) deviates in Period 1 and
slightly undercuts its competitors. This affords Firm 1 an expected profit arbi-
trarily close to VD in Period 1.
At the end of Period 1, Firm 1’s competitors observe that they sold zero, but
they cannot infer from this information alone that a deviation took place, be-
cause zero sales could result from zero demand, or from biased demand. There-
fore, in Eq∗, a firm that sold zero at the end of Period 1 must set the monopoly
price V at the beginning of Period 2. Therefore, with probability 1, having
slightly undercut its competitors in Period 1, Firm 1 can undercut its competi-
tors again in Period 2, which yields an expected Period 2 profit arbitrarily close
to VD .
At the beginning of Period 3, Firm 1’s competitors have two additional pieces
of information. They observe that they sold zero in Period 2, but this provides
no information on Firm 1’s Period 2 behavior, because zero sales could result
from zero or biased demand. They also observed Firm 1’s Period 1 sales at
the end of Period 2. If D1 /∈ SH , Firm 1’s Period 1 sales (equal to D1) are
compatible with the possibility that Firm 1 set a price equal to V in Period 1
(if demand was zero, or biased in favor of Firm 1). Therefore, if D1 /∈ SH , all
the information available to Firm 1’s competitors at the beginning of Period 3
is compatible with some equilibrium path. The efficiency requirement therefore
implies that Firm 1’s competitors set prices greater than or equal to V in Period
3. This allows Firm 1 to undercut them again and earn close to the monopoly
profit. Therefore, with probability
(
1− piH), Firm 1 can earn arbitrarily close
to VD in Period 3.
At the beginning of Period 4, Firm 1’s competitors have two new pieces of
information: their own zero sales in Period 3, and Firm 1’s Period 2 sales. Their
own Period 3 zero sales provide no information on Firm 1’s Period 3 behavior, as
zero sales could have been caused by zero demand. Consider now the information
conveyed by Firm 1’s Period 2 sales, in the case where D1 /∈ SH , D1 /∈ SK and
D2 /∈ SH . Let p(∆) denote the price which, according to Eq∗, Firm 1 should set
in Period 2 after having sold ∆ in Period 1. The symmetry requirement implies
that p(∆) is the price which, according to Eq∗, any firm that sold ∆ in Period
1 should set in Period 2. If ∆ /∈ SK , then with a strictly positive probability
demand is normal in Period 1, with total demand equal to n∆, implying that
all firms sell ∆ in Period 1. Eq∗ thus prescribes that with a strictly positive
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probability, all firms set the price p(∆) in Period 2. The efficiency requirement
then implies p(∆) = V . In other words, unless ∆ ∈ SK , Eq∗ prescribes Firm
1 to set price V in Period 2 after observing that its sales were equal to ∆ in
Period 1. Therefore, if D1 /∈ SK , Firm 1’s competitors cannot infer that Firm
1 deviated simply by observing its Period 2 sales, unless D2 ∈ SH : Firm 1’s
competitors can attribute Firm 1’s Period 2 sales to zero demand (if D2 = 0)
or to biased demand (if D2 ∈ SB), rather than to a deviation. If D1 /∈ SH ,
D1 /∈ SK and D2 /∈ SH , Eq∗ thus prescribes that Firm 1’s competitors set a
price equal to V in Period 4. With probability
(
1− piK − piH) (1− piH), Firm
1 can therefore undercut its competitors in Period 4 and earn profits arbitrarily
close to VD .
The above reasoning shows that if other firms set prices as prescribed by Eq∗,
there exists a non-equilibrium strategy allowing Firm 1 to earn in expectation
a profit arbitrarily close to VD with probability 1 in Periods 1 and 2, as well as
in Period 3 with a probability of at least
(
1− piH), and again in Period 4 with a
probability of at least
(
1− piK − piH) (1− piH), leading to an expected sum of
future discounted profits ahead of Period 1 arbitrarily close to (or greater than)
VD
(
1−δ4
1−δ − piH δ2 −
(
1 − (1 − piK − piH ) (1 − piH )) δ3)
= nV d
(
1−δ4
1−δ − piHδ2 −
(
piH
(
2− piH − piK)+ piK) δ3)
By the definition of an equilibrium, this should be less than or equal to the
expected sum of future per-firm discounted profits ahead of Period 1 induced
by compliance with Eq∗, namely Vd1−δ . If the former expression is greater than
the latter, that is, if (1) holds, then no SECE exists.
This proof highlights the role that communication could play: each firm’s
ignorance of its competitors’ sales prevents a compensating market share real-
location from starting right after a firm sold ∆ /∈ SK : a firm in such a situation
cannot know whether demand was biased in its favor (which could warrant the
immediate start of a correction period) or not, unless firms find a way to pool
their sales data. Efficiency mandates that firms not launch a correction period
till they know, but this delay increases individual incentives to deviate.
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4 The scope for collusion with communication
4.1 An informal overview of the role played by communi-
cation
We consider the same environment as before, with one addition: at the end
of every period, each firm is required to report its sales. Formally, each firm
chooses a message at the end of each period. The meaning of the message is
understood to be about each firm’s sales.
The role of communication in an efficient collusive equilibrium is the fol-
lowing. In contrast to the situation prevailing in the absence of communication
(see the above discussion of Proposition 1), communication prevents a firm from
enjoying a 100% market share at the collusive price during four periods. In the
presence of communication, this would be possible only for three periods.
Assume that at the end of each period, each firm is expected to report its
sales, and that (i) whenever a firm is found to have lied, a price war ensues;
and (ii) if reported sales point to an asymmetry, this leads to a market share
reallocation phase at the expense of the firm that sold ’too much’, for a few
periods. Assume that Firm 1 would like to undercut its competitors in order to
serve the entire demand, at the monopoly price, for as long as it can. If it does
so in Period 1 and then lies about its Period 1 sales, its lie will be exposed at
the end of Period 2, leading to a price war at the beginning of Period 3. In the
end, Firm 1 benefits from undercutting during Periods 1 and 2 only.
Alternatively, Firm 1 could decide to truthfully report its sales. In this case,
all firms would know that sales were asymmetric at the end of Period 1, and
the equilibrium would prescribe a market share reallocation phase starting in
Period 2, during which Firm 1 would sell zero. If Firm 1 decides to deviate and
slightly undercut its competitors in Period 2, then, unless demand was zero in
Period 2, its deviation is revealed at the end of Period 3, leading to a price war
at the beginning of Period 4. In the end, Firm 1 benefits from undercutting in
Periods 1 to 3.
In other words, in the presence of communication, a firm can deviate and
obtain a 100% market share at the monopoly price for three consecutive periods
at most, whereas it could do so for four periods in the absence of communica-
tion (at least for some realizations of demand). The resulting decrease in the
profitability of undercutting makes efficient collusion more likely. Also, in equi-
librium, the compensating market share reallocation following asymmetric sales
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outcomes (resulting from biased demand) starts one period after the asymmetric
outcome, rather than two periods later in the absence of communication. This
makes it easier to deter deviations, which facilitates collusion.
4.2 Description of the candidate equilibrium
We consider the following strategy profiles. There exists an integer k (to be
interpreted as the duration of compensating market share reallocation phase
after an asymmetric sales outcome is inferred from sales reports) such that, at
the beginning of a period, the state of the game can be any of the following
(nk + 2):
• normal collusion;
• price war (which cannot occur in equilibrium);
• correction at the expense of some firm i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), with r remaining
correction periods (1 ≤ r ≤ k).24
In a nutshell, ’normal collusion’ is a state of the game in which all firms set the
monopoly price. It gives way to temporary correction phases whenever sales
reports point to asymmetric sales. During a correction phase, the firm that
sold more than the other in the last normal collusion period sells zero, after
which firms return to normal collusion.25 Price wars do not occur along the
equilibrium path. They occur in the (out-of-equilibrium) event of an inaccurate
sales report, or of a sales report revealing that a firm failed to comply with the
prescribed equilibrium strategy.26
Prices and messages in the candidate equilibrium Equilibrium actions
at the beginning of Period t depend only on the state of the game at the begin-
ning of Period t :
24In what follows, the firm at the expense of which a correction takes place in sometimes
called the ’targeted firm’.
25As is explained below, transition rules are a bit more complex than this summary de-
scription, to account for the possibility that during a correction phase at the expense of some
firm, another firm benefitted from biased demand, in which case it becomes the target of a
new correction phase.
26This is in constrast to HS. In HS, the incentive not to misreport sales results from the
existence of a function associating to each vector of sales reports the probability of a shift
to a noncollusive phase. This function is such that truth-telling is an equilibrium strategy.
In our model, the assumption that sales data become public with a lag allows for a simpler
mechanism: lies trigger price wars once they are exposed as lies.
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• If the state of the game at the beginning of Period t is ’normal collusion’,
then all firms set a price equal to V ;
• If the state of the game at the beginning of Period t is ’collusion with
a correction at the expense of Firm i’, then Firm i sets a price equal to
V + 1 whereas all other firms set a price of V ;
• If the state of the game at the beginning of Period t is ’price war’, then
all firms set a price equal to 0;
Also, in the candidate equilibrium, each firm’s message at the end of a period
consists in truthfully reporting its sales, after any history along which it acted
according to the candidate equilibrium in the previous periods (irrespective of
the other firm’s actions).27
Transitions between states of the game in the candidate equilibrium
The state of the game at the beginning of Period 1 is ’normal collusion’. At the
beginning of Period t , the state of the game is determined as follows.
• Evidence of lying leads to a price war. (For t ≥ 3 ). Whatever the state of
the game at the beginning of Period (t − 1 ), if the information on Period
(t − 2 ) sales, which becomes public at the end of Period (t − 1 ), does not
coincide with some firm’s report (sent at the end of Period (t − 2 )), the
state of the game at the beginning of Period t is ’price war’. Also, if the
sales reported by all firms at the end of Period (t − 1 ) do not correspond
to any possible outcome (for instance, if the sum of the reported sales does
not belong to S), which implies that at least one firm lied, the state of the
game at the beginning of Period t is ’price war’. In other words, lying,
which cannot occur along an equilibrium path, leads to a price war.
• Price wars last forever. If the state of the game at the beginning of Period
(t − 1 ) is ’price war’, then it remains ’price war’ at the beginning of Period
t . This reflects the fact that a price war is meant to follow outcomes that
could only result from deviations. For maximal deterrence, a price war
27The restriction implied by the words ’after any history along which it acted according to
the candidate equilibrium in the previous periods’ is mentioned for the following reason: if
a firm deviated from the abovementioned strategies by undercutting its competitor, it may
find it optimal to also misreport its sales. For instance, on the basis of the transition rules
described hereafter, if a firm undercuts its competitors in the ’normal’ state of the world and
demand turns out to belong to SH , it finds it more profitable not to report its sales in order
to delay the price war by one period.
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lasts forever. This is compatible with efficiency since price wars cannot
occur along an equilibrium path.
• Normal collusion is followed by normal collusion if reported sales are sym-
metric. If the state of the game at the beginning of Period (t − 1 ) is
’normal collusion’, none of the above conditions holds (i.e., there is no ev-
idence of lying) and all firms’ reported sales for Period (t − 1 ) are equal,
then the state of the game remains ’normal collusion’ at the beginning of
Period t .
• Normal collusion is followed by a correction if reported sales are asym-
metric but compatible with equilibrium behavior. If none of the above
conditions holds (i.e., there is no evidence of lying), the state of the game
at the beginning of Period (t − 1 ) is ’normal collusion’ and for some i,
Firm i’s reported sales for Period (t − 1 ) are some ∆ ∈ SB whereas all
other firms’ reported Period (t− 1) sales are zero, then the state of the
game at the beginning of Period t is ’correction at the expense of Firm i,
with k remaining periods’.
• Normal collusion is followed by a price war if reported sales reveal pricing
that is incompatible with equilibrium behavior. If the state of the game at
the beginning of Period (t − 1 ) is ’normal collusion’ and none of the above
conditions is met, then the state of the game at the beginning of Period t
is ’price war’.
• A correction phase leads to a price war if reported sales reveal a lack of
compliance. If the state of the world at the beginning of Period (t − 1 ) is
’collusion with a correction at the expense of Firm i’, and reported sales
are neither such that Firm i sold zero while all others sold equal amounts
adding up to some ∆ ∈ S (which should be observed if all firms complied
with the candidate equilibrium and demand was normal or biased in favor
of a Firm i), nor that all firms but one sold zero, and one firm (different
from Firm i) had sales belonging to SB (which should be observed if all
firms complied with the candidate equilibrium and demand was biased
in favor of a firm other than Firm i), then the state of the world at the
beginning of Period t is ’price war’.
• As long as there is no evidence of lying nor lack of compliance, a correction
phase continues, until it gives way to ’normal collusion’. At the end of
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a correction period at the expense of Firm i with r remaining periods, if
there is no evidence of lying nor lack of compliance, and the sales reported
by all firms other than Firm i at the end of Period (t− 1) are equal, then
at the beginning of period t the state of the game is ’normal collusion’
if r = 1 and ’correction at the expense of Firm i with (r − 1) remaining
periods’ if r > 1. If there is no evidence of lying nor of lack of compliance,
but reported sales reveal that one firm other than Firm i (labeled Firm
j) had nonzero sales, whereas all others had zero sales (which can happen
only if n ≥ 3), then at the beginning of Period t the state of the world is
’correction at the expense of Firm j, with k correction periods remaining’.
In other words, if a non-targeted firm benefits from biased demand, the
correction at the expense of the previously targeted firm stops (even if
there remained more than one period), and a new correction phase starts,
targeting the firm that just benefitted from biased demand.28
4.3 A sufficient condition for the candidate equilibrium to
be an actual equilibrium
Proposition 2. If there are at least three firms, and there exists an integer k
such that Conditions (2) and (3) hold, then the above strategy profiles correspond
to a symmetric efficient collusive equilibrium. If there are two firms (n=2)
and there exists an integer k such that Conditions (2)-(4) hold, then the above
strategy profiles correspond to a symmetric efficient collusive equilibrium.
n − nδ2 + npiLδ2 < δk
(
1 − (n − 1 )pi
B
n
)k
(2)
28This property of the candidate equilibrium is meant for the sake of tractability. There
may exist other, more complex equilibria, which make efficient collusion possible for a broader
set of parameters than the candidate equilibrium outlined in this paper. However, for our
purposes, it is enough to prove the existence of a SECE with communication for parameter
values that are inconsistent with the existence of a SECE without communication. To this
end, finding a ’good enough’ SECE in the presence of communication is sufficient.
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n− 1− nδ + δk+1
(
1 − (n − 1 )pi
B
n
)k
−piHδ
(
δk
(
1− (n− 1)pi
B
n
)k
+ nδ − n
)
+piLδ
(
1− δk
(
1− (n− 1)pi
B
n
)k)
+
δ2piB
1− δ
(
1− piH − piL) < 0 (3)
1− 2 δ + δk+1 + piH δ (2− δk)+ piLδ (1− δk) > 0 (4)
The proof of Proposition 2 is in the appendix. We explain hereafter the role
of conditions (2)-(4).
Condition (2) implies that a firm expecting other firms to behave in accor-
dance with the hypothetized equilibrium, and having set its price in accordance
with the candidate equilibrium, finds that it is a best response for it to truth-
fully report its sales. (2) also implies that a firm subjected to a correction finds
that it is optimal for it to comply with the prescribed equilibrium behavior and
sell nothing for a few periods, rather than to undercut its competitors and earn
monopoly profits.
Condition (3) implies that a firm not subjected to a correction has no interest
in undercutting its competitors.
In the case of two firms, condition (4) implies that a firm not subjected to
a correction has no interest in setting a price above its competitor’s in order to
sell zero and trigger a correction phase targeting its competitor.29
5 Comparative statics: the marginal impact of
communication
Proposition 1 provides a sufficient condition for efficient collusion to be unsus-
tainable without communication and Proposition 2 provides a sufficient con-
dition for efficient collusion to be sustainable with communication. Combining
these results leads to a sufficient condition for efficient collusion to be sustainable
only in the presence of communication. We find that for some parameter val-
ues, communication on self-reported sales makes efficient collusion sustainaible,
whereas it is not sustainable without communication - even though the underly-
ing information structure is the same in both cases, in the sense that the timing
29This issue arises only in the case of two firms, as is explained in the proof.
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of sales verifiability is not altered by communication:
Proposition 3. For each n between 2 and 10, there exist parameter values
such that no symmetric efficient collusive equilibrium exists if communication
is impossible, but one such equilibrium exists if communication is possible.
Even though statements on the set of parameters such that the existence
of a SECE requires communication are difficult to interpret since the model is
highly stylized, we present hereafter a few results on the set of values of δ for
which collusion requires communication.
One can check that, if n = 2 , conditions (1)-(4) are simultaneously satisfied
if piH = 0.1, piL and piK are close enough to zero, and δ = 0.82, with k = 2 .
Also, Graph 1 presents results for values of n between 3 and 10, in the
case where piH , piL, piK and piB are close to zero. For the sake of readability,
we present these results in terms of the discount rate applied over a period,
that is, the rate r such that δ = 11+r . As is shown in Graph 1, communication
substantially expands the set of discount rates compatible with the existence
of a symmetric efficient collusive equilibrium (that is, discount rates such that
conditions (1)-(3) are met).30
INSERT GRAPH 1.
6 Conclusion
The model presented in this paper casts light on the marginal impact of commu-
nication on the feasibility of collusion: the exchange of sales reports may lead to
higher prices because it facilitates the recourse of colluding firms to incentive-
compatible market share reallocation mechanisms, limiting the need for price
wars. This effect may be present even though the information exchange is mere
30Since Proposition 1 states a necessary condition for the existence of a SECE without
communication, and Proposition 2 states a sufficient condition for the existence of a SECE
with communication, Graph 1 is conservative. The upper part of each bar depicts a set of
discount rates for which communication is necessary to the existence of a SECE: it is the set
of discount rates such that conditions (1)-(3) are met when piH , piL, piK and piB are close to
zero. The entire set of the discount rates for which a SECE exists only when communication
is possible is likely to strictly include the interval shown in Graph 1. This is why the legend
for the lower part of each bar contains the word “may”. For some of the corresponding values
of the discount rate, collusion is possible without communication (for instance for very small
discount rates, corresponding to values of δ very close to 1). But for some other values in the
lower part of each bar (those close to the limit between the two parts), communication may
in fact be necessary to the existence of a SECE, even though this is not visible on Graph 1.
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cheap talk, in the sense that it does not make sales data verifiable sooner than
they would be without communication.
While the assumption that sales data become public after a delay is strong,
it nevertheless is relevant to many markets. Also, our results are robust to weak-
ening this assumption. Assume for instance that sales data become public after
being audited by third parties (as was the case in several cartels mentioned
in the introduction as a motivation for this paper). If a firm that undercuts
its competitors and increases its sales as a result can, with a small probabil-
ity, succeed in concealing some sales from its auditor, then our results should
carry over, since the profitability of undercutting is a continuous function of the
probabilities of the various states of the world in the subsequent periods.
Turning to the implications for antitrust enforcement, our results suggest
that the exchange of sales reports should be considered suspicious if reports
revealing market share swings lead to prompt compensating movements, to an
extent that cannot be explained by individual firms’ unilateral profit maximiza-
tion behavior, given the intertemporal pattern of demand shocks. Competition
authorities should not rule out the possibility that communication is meant to
facilitate such compensation mechanisms, even if the data that are exchanged
between firms are not verifiable when communication takes place, and commu-
nication does not affect the date at which they will become verifiable.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Step 1: the expected sum of future discounted
profits for a firm depending on the state of the game. Let Wc,r, Wc−,r and W
denote the expected sum of future discounted profits of a firm at the beginning
of, respectively, a correction period at its own expense with r remaining periods
(1 ≤ r ≤ k), a correction period at another firm’s expense with r remaining
periods, and a normal collusion period (assuming that all firms behave according
to the candidate equilibrium). Since, at the beginning of a normal collusion
period, the distribution of future sales is symmetric across firms, and along
any equilibrium path total expected profits add up to V D, it follows that W =
V D
n(1−δ) . Also, since ahead of any period along any equilibrium path, n or (n− 1)
firms are in a symmetric situation, Wc−,r ≤ V D(n−1)(1−δ) .
Case 1: n = 2. In this case, it follows from the description of the transition
between states of the game that Wc,r = δrW .
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Case 2: n ≥ 3. In any correction period, there is a probability (n−1)piBn
that one of the non-targeted firms will benefit from biased demand, implying
that in the following period, the expected sum of the previously targeted firm’
future flow of discounted profits will be Wc−,k . This implies that Wc,1 =
δ
[(
1− (n−1)piBn
)
W + (n−1)pi
B
n Wc−,k
]
and for any r between 2 and k, Wc,r =
δ
[(
1− (n−1)piBn
)
Wc,r−1 +
(n−1)piB
n Wc−,k
]
. These equalities imply that for any
r comprised between 1 and k,
Wc,r = δ
r
(
1− (n− 1)pi
B
n
)r
W+
δ(n−1)piB
n
1− δ(n−1)piBn
[
1− δk
(
1− (n− 1)pi
B
n
)k]
Wc−,k.
The above results imply that for any number of firms n ≥ 2, the following
inequalities hold:
δrV D
(1− δ)n
(
1− (n− 1)pi
B
n
)r
≤Wc,r ≤ δ
rV D
(1− δ)n
(
1− (n− 1)pi
B
n
)r
+
δpiBV D
n (1− δ) .
(5)
We prove now that for any r (1 ≤ r ≤ k), Wc,r ≤ W ≤ Wc−,r. First,
the above Bellman equations characterizing each Wc,r imply, by induction, that
either for all r, Wc,r ≤ W , or for all r, Wc,r ≥ W . Assume (by contradiction)
that Wc,k > W . Since expected profits add up to V D ahead of any period
in the candidate equilibrium, the equality Wc,k + (n − 1)Wc−,k = nW holds,
implying that Wc−,k < W . But this inequality, together with the Bellman
equation characterizing Wc,1 implies that Wc,1 < W , which is a contradiction.
Finally, notice that the inequality Wc,r ≤W implies that for any r (2 ≤ r ≤
k), Wc,r+1 ≤Wc,r and Wc−,r+1 ≥Wc−,r.
Step 2. Whatever the state of the world at the beginning of Period t , if
Firm i complied with the strategies prescribed by the candidate equilibrium in
all previous periods, and it set a price at the beginning of Period t in accordance
with the candidate equilibrium, then reporting sales truthfully is a best response
for Firm i, assuming that all other firms behave according to the candidate
equilibrium.
Proof. Since misreporting at the end of Period t is detected at the latest at
the end of Period (t+1), leading to a price war from Period (t+2) onwards, and
expected per-period profits cannot exceed total profits V D, misreporting would
allow Firm i to earn at most V D in Period (t + 1) and zero forever after. In
contrast, complying with the strategy prescribed by the candidate equilibrium
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would lead, at the beginning of Period (t + 1), to an expected sum of future
discounted profits greater than or equal toWc,k. Since (2) implies the inequality
Wc,r ≥ V D for all r , truthful sales reporting is a best response for a firm that
behaved as prescribed by the candidate equilibrium.
Step 3. At the beginning of a correction period, it is a best response for all
firms to set the price prescribed by the candidate equilibrium.
Proof. Assume the state of the game at the beginning of Period t is ’cor-
rection at the expense of Firm 1 (without loss of generality), with r remaining
periods’. We prove first that it is optimal for Firm 1 to behave as prescribed
by the candidate equilibrium, that is, by setting p1t = V + 1 and truthfully
reporting its zero sales. We showed in Step 2 of this proof that conditional
of setting a price equal to V + 1 it is optimal for Firm 1 to truthfully report
its zero sales. Assume that Firm 1 sets a price p1t 6= V + 1. Any price strictly
greater than V yields the same zero profits as the equilibrium strategy in Period
t and the same information to other firms. Therefore, such prices lead to exactly
the same payoff distribution for Firm 1 in Period t and subsequent periods as
p1t = V + 1. Consider now a price p1t ≤ V . Unless Period t demand is zero
(which happens with probability piL), such a price leads to nonzero sales for
Firm 1, implying detection at the end of Period (t+ 1) at the latest, and a price
war starting in Period (t+ 2) at the latest. Since Firm 1’s expected per-period
profit cannot exceed total profits V D, such a price leads to an expected sum
of future discounted profits smaller than or equal to VD
[
(1 + δ) + pi
Lδ2
1−δ
]
. (2)
implies that this expression is less than Wc,k, that is, less than Wc,r for any
r ≤ k. Therefore, it is optimal for Firm 1 to follow the strategy prescribed by
the candidate equilibrium, which yields it an expected sum of future discounted
profits equal to Wc,r.
Consider now a firm other than Firm 1, say, Firm 2 (without loss of gener-
ality). If there are only two firms (n = 2) then whatever price Firm 2 sets in
Period t, the state of the world at the beginning of Period (t + 1) is the same
as the one that would prevail if Firm 2 sets a price p2t = V . Therefore, the only
effect of setting another price is to reduce Firm 2’s profit. Assume now that
n ≥ 3. Complying with the actions prescribed by the candidate equilibrium
leads for Firm 2 to an expected sum of future discounted profits equal toWc−,r.
Assume now that Firm 2 deviates and sets a price p2t 6= V . If p2t > V , then
Firm 2 earns zero in Period t and whatever it reports at the end of Period t,
its deviation is detected at the end of Period (t + 1) unless demand in Period
t is zero, because a distribution of sales such that total sales are nonzero while
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two firms have zero sales is incompatible with equilibrium. This, together with
the fact that a firm’s per-period profit cannot exceed V D, implies that the cor-
responding expected sum of future discounted profits is less than or equal to
VD
[
δ + pi
Lδ2
1−δ
]
. Condition (2) implies that this expression is less thanWc,k, and
therefore less than Wc−,r. A price p2t > V therefore cannot improve upon the
behavior prescribed by the candidate equilibrium for Firm 2.
Consider now the possibility of a price p2t < V . Such a price would yield
Firm 2 at most V D in Period t. If Dt = 0, which happens with probability
piL, Period t sales are identical to what they would be absent a deviation by
Firm 2. Therefore, as shown in Step 2, it would be optimal for Firm 2 in this
case to report zero sales, leading in Period (t + 1) to either ’normal collusion’
(if r = 1) or to ’correction at the expense of Firm 1, with (r − 1) remaining
periods’ (if r ≥ 2). This would lead at the beginning of Period (t + 1) to an
expected sum of future discounted profits equal to Wc−,r−1 (with the slight
abuse of notation Wc−,0 = W ). If Dt ∈ SH , which happens with probability
piH , Firm 2’s deviation is known to its competitors at the end of Period (t+ 1)
at the latest, leading to zero profits from Period (t+ 2) onwards. Therefore, in
this case, the deviation leads at the beginning of Period (t+ 1) to an expected
sum of future discounted profits smaller than or equal to V D. In all other
cases (Dt ∈ SB), a deviation leads to a sales profile that is compatible with
equilibrium behavior (with demand biased in favor of Firm 2). As shown in
Step 2, it is then optimal for Firm 2 to truthfully reveal its sales, leading at
the beginning of Period (t+ 1) to an expected sum of future discounted profits
equal to Wc,k. Therefore, a deviation with p2t < V would lead at the beginning
of Period t to an expected sum of future discounted profits less than or equal to
V D + δ
(
piLWc−,r−1 + piHV D +
(
1− piL − piH)Wc,k), whereas in the absence
of deviation this expected sum is equal to Wc−,r. The difference between this
expected sum in the absence and in the presence of such a deviation is thus
greater than or equal to
Wc−,r −
[
V D + δ
(
piLWc−,r−1 + piHV D +
(
1− piL − piH)Wc,k)]
= W − [V D + δ (piLW + piHV D + (1− piL − piH)Wc,k)]
+ δpiL (Wc−,r −Wc,r−1) +
(
1− δpiL) (Wc−,r −W )
≥ W − [V D + δ (piLW + piHV D + (1− piL − piH)Wc,k)] .
Condition (3), together with inequality (5), implies that this difference is
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positive, so that it is a best response for Firm 2 to follow the strategy prescribed
by the candidate equilibrium.
Step 4. If the state of the world at the beginning of Period t is ’normal
collusion’ and all firms followed the strategy prescribed by the candidate equi-
librium in all previous periods, then it is a best response for Firm 1 (without
loss of generality) to set p1t = V .
Proof. Consider a subgame starting in period t , such that the state of the
game at the beginning of Period t is ’normal collusion’ and all firms followed the
strategy prescribed by the candidate equilibrium in all previous periods. Firm
1’s expected sum of future discounted profits is W if it sets price as prescribed
by the candidate equilibrium (that is, p1t = V ).
We prove hereafter that, if conditions (2)-(3) hold (as well as condition (4),
if n = 2), then in a ’normal collusion’ period, neither setting a price p1t < V
nor setting one such that p1t > V leads to an expected sum of future discounted
profits strictly greater than W . We prove this by contradiction.
We assume that there exists a best response such that, with a positive prob-
ability, Firm 1 sets a price p1t < V in some ’normal collusion’ state. Let W ′
denote Firm 1’s expected sum of future discounted profits at the beginning of
any such ’normal collusion’ state, given this best response. Since all possible
best responses must yield the same expected sum of future discounted profits
at the beginning of any ’normal collusion’ period, W ′ is also equal to Firm 1’s
expected sum of future discounted profits at the beginning of any subsequent
’normal collusion’ period.
In Period t , setting a price p1t < V allows Firm 1 to serve the entire demand,
leading to an expected profit below VD . If Dt = 0, Period t sales are identical
to what they would be absent any deviation from the candidate equilibrium.
Therefore, as per the proof in Step 2, it would be optimal for Firm 1 in this
case to report zero sales, leading in Period (t + 1) to a new ’normal collusion’
period, and to an expected sum of future discounted profits equal to W ′ at the
beginning of Period (t + 1). If Dt ∈ SH , Firm 1’s deviation is known to its
competitors at the end of Period (t + 1) at the latest, leading to zero profits
from Period (t+ 2) onwards. In this case, the deviation leads at the beginning
of Period (t + 1) to an expected sum of future discounted profits smaller than
or equal to V D. In all other cases (Dt ∈ SB), a deviation leads to sales that are
compatible with equilibrium behavior (with demand biased in favor of Firm 1).
The reasoning of Step 2 implies that it is then optimal for Firm 1 to truthfully
reveal its sales, leading at the beginning of Period (t + 1) to an expected sum
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of future discounted profits equal to Wc,k. Therefore, a deviation with p1t < V
would lead at the beginning of Period t to an expected sum of future discounted
profits less than or equal to V D + δ
(
piLW ′ + piHV D +
(
1− piL − piH)Wc,k):
W ′ ≤ V D + δ (piLW ′ + piHV D + (1− piL − piH)Wc,k) ,
implying
W ′ ≤ V D
(
1 + piHδ
)
+ δ
(
1− piL − piH)Wc,k
1− piLδ .
Condition (3), together with inequality (5), implies that W ′ < W . Therefore,
it is not a best response for a firm to undercut its competitors in a normal
collusion period.
In order to show that there exists no best response such that, with a positive
probability, p1t > V in some ’normal collusion’ period, we need to distinguish
between the case n = 2 and the case n ≥ 3.
Consider first the case n ≥ 3. If p1t > V , then Firm 1 earns zero in Period t
and whatever it reports at the end of Period t, its deviation is detected at the end
of Period (t+1) unless demand in Period t is zero, because a distribution of sales
such that total sales are nonzero while two firms have zero sales is incompatible
with equilibrium. This, together with the fact that a firm’s per-period expected
profit cannot exceed V D, implies that the corresponding expected sum of future
discounted profits is less than or equal to VD
[
δ + pi
Lδ2
1−δ
]
. Condition (2) implies
that this expression is less than W . A price p1t > V therefore cannot improve
upon the behavior prescribed by the candidate equilibrium for Firm 1 in a
’normal collusion’ period.
We consider now the case n = 2. We assume (by contradiction) that there
exists a best response such that p1t > V . Let Z denote Firm 1’s expected sum
of future discounted profits at the beginning of any ’normal collusion’ period,
as induced by this best response. In Period t , this price causes Firm 1’s profit
to be 0. If Dt ∈ SH , Firm 1’s deviation is known to Firm 2 at the end of Period
t, leading to a price war and zero profits from Period (t + 1) onwards. In all
other cases, Period t sales are compatible with equilibrium behavior (with zero
demand, or demand biased in favor of Firm 2). As shown in Step 2, this implies
that it is optimal for Firm 1 to truthfully report its sales. If Dt = 0, the state of
the world at the beginning of Period (t + 1 ) is ’normal collusion’. If Dt ∈ SB , it
is ’correction at the expense of Firm 2 with k periods remaining’, leading to an
expected profit of 2V D during k periods for Firm 1, before a return to normal
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collusion.
Given the probabilities of the various states of the world, the expected sum
of Firm 1’s future discounted profits at the beginning of a ’normal collusion’
period in which it sets a price p1t > V is thus
2Vd + piLδZ +
(
1 − piL − piH ) δk+1Z + 2VdpiH δ.
The equality
Z = piLδZ +
(
1 − piL − piH ) (2Vdδ (1 + δ + ...+ δk−1 )+ δk+1Z )
implies
Z =
2
(
1 − piL − piH )Vdδ (1 − δk)
(1 − δ) (1 − piLδ − (1 − piL − piH ) δk+1 ) ,
which implies in turn Z < Vd1−δ , as a consequence of (4). This proves that the
hypothetical best response under consideration is strictly dominated by compli-
ance with the hypothetized equilibrium. Therefore, it is not a best response for
Firm 1 to set a price p1t > V in a ’normal collusion’ period.
Step 5. The above steps imply that the strategy profile under consideration is
an equilibrium strategy profile. By construction, this equilibrium is symmetric.
It is also efficient, because along the equilibrium path, the states of the world
that occur with a positive probability are ’normal collusion’ and ’correction in
favor of either firm’, and in both cases, the lowest of all firms’ prices is equal to
the monopoly price V .
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Graph 1. The existence of a symmetric efficient collusive equilibrium according to 
firms’ discount rate (assuming πH, πL, πK, and πB to be close to zero). 	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